I'll research this systematically — first finding the statute and its citation network, then analyzing the key judicial interpretations of the due diligence requirement under Section 79 of the IT Act.

Now let me get the statute text and dispatch parallel sub-agents to analyze the key cases in depth.

Excellent — I have the statute text and structure. Now let me dispatch parallel sub-agents to deeply analyze the landmark cases and find additional interpretive threads.

Let me verify one key case that emerged from the research — the Supreme Court judgment in Google India v. Visakha Industries.

Now I have comprehensive findings across all key cases. Let me compile the definitive analysis.

Judicial Interpretation of the Due Diligence Requirement for Intermediaries Under Section 79 of the IT Act

I. The Statutory Framework

Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (as amended in 2009) creates a conditional safe harbour for intermediaries. The due diligence obligation is located in Section 79(2)(c): an intermediary's exemption from liability applies only if it "observes due diligence while discharging his duties under this Act and also observes such other guidelines as the Central Government may prescribe in this behalf." The "guidelines" prescribed are the IT (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011 (now replaced by the IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021).

The safe harbour is further conditioned by Section 79(3), which removes protection where the intermediary (a) conspired/abetted/aided the unlawful act, or (b) upon receiving "actual knowledge" or government notification of unlawful content, fails to "expeditiously remove or disable access."

Courts have developed a rich body of jurisprudence interpreting these provisions across ten interrelated themes.

II. The Foundational Supreme Court Interpretation

A. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1

This is the cornerstone of all Section 79 jurisprudence (303+ citations). Justice R.F. Nariman, writing for the Court, read down Section 79(3)(b) with two critical caveats:

1. "Actual knowledge" means knowledge through a court order:

"Section 79(3)(b) has to be read down to mean that the intermediary upon receiving actual knowledge that a court order has been passed asking it to expeditiously remove or disable access to certain material must then fail to expeditiously remove or disable access to that material. This is for the reason that otherwise it would be very difficult for intermediaries like Google, Facebook etc. to act when millions of requests are made and the intermediary is then to judge as to which of such requests are legitimate and which are not."

— Shreya Singhal v. UOI, (2015) 5 SCC 1, ¶117 (Indian Kanoon)

2. "Unlawful acts" narrowed to Article 19(2) subjects:

The court order or government notification must "strictly conform to the subject matters laid down in Article 19(2)." Unlawful acts beyond Article 19(2) — sovereignty, security of state, public order, decency/morality, contempt, defamation, incitement — "obviously cannot form any part of Section 79."

3. Due diligence under Section 79(2)(c) — linked to the 2011 Rules:

The Court set out how due diligence is fulfilled by complying with Rule 3 of the Intermediaries Guidelines Rules — publishing rules/regulations, privacy policy, and user agreements, and informing users of prohibited content categories.

— Shreya Singhal v. UOI, ¶113 (Indian Kanoon)

4. Rule 3(4) of the 2011 Rules read down identically:

Rule 3(4), which required intermediaries to act within 36 hours upon "obtaining knowledge by itself or been brought to actual knowledge by an affected person in writing," was read down so that "knowledge" means only knowledge through a court order. Private complaints do not trigger the takedown obligation.

— Shreya Singhal v. UOI, ¶118 (Indian Kanoon)

B. Google India Pvt. Ltd. v. Visakha Industries, AIR 2020 SC 350

The second major SC pronouncement on Section 79 (50+ citations). The Court examined whether Google India could claim safe harbour in a criminal defamation case where defamatory content was posted on Google Groups.

Key holdings:

• Section 79 prior to its 2009 substitution did not protect an intermediary for offences under Sections 499/500 IPC.
• Under post-amendment Section 79, exemption is available but not unconditionally — the intermediary must prove compliance with due diligence requirements.
• Where the intermediary "did not move its little finger to stop dissemination of the unlawful and objectionable material," it cannot claim exemption under either the original or amended Section 79.

— Google India v. Visakha Industries, AIR 2020 SC 350, ¶137 (Indian Kanoon)

The Court ultimately held the question of whether Google India qualified as an intermediary was a matter for trial, and remanded accordingly.

III. What Constitutes "Due Diligence" — The Evolving Standard

A. Under the 2011 Rules: Publish Terms + Notice-and-Takedown

Under the original regime, courts consistently held that due diligence under Section 79(2)(c) is satisfied by:

1. Publishing rules, privacy policy, and user agreements informing users of prohibited content categories (Rule 3(1)–(2) of 2011 Rules)
2. Implementing notice-and-takedown mechanisms — acting within 36 hours of receiving a court order
3. Providing rights management tools such as hash-block filters or content identification systems

This standard was established in MySpace Inc. v. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd., FAO(OS) 540/2011, Delhi HC (DB), 23 Dec 2016 (Indian Kanoon), where the Division Bench found MySpace's user agreement embargoes on uploading infringing content, combined with its provision of Rights Management Tools (notice-and-takedown, hash block filters), constituted sufficient due diligence compliance.

B. Under the 2021 Rules: "Reasonable Efforts" — A Higher Bar

The IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 introduced the concept of "reasonable efforts" under Rule 3(1)(b), requiring intermediaries to make reasonable efforts to cause users not to host, display, upload, or share prohibited content. This has been interpreted as raising the bar beyond the 2011 Rules' largely procedural requirements.

Key applications:

In IndiaMart Intermesh Ltd. v. Puma SE, the Delhi HC Division Bench held that while IndiaMart was prima facie entitled to safe harbour protection, the "reasonable efforts" obligation under Rule 3(1)(b)(iv) meant the intermediary was obligated to prevent previously-delisted trademark infringers from re-listing:

"Prima facie, failure to prevent such a seller from re-listing itself in a case where its listing has been pulled down on account of infringement of IPR, would fall foul of the requirement of due diligence."

— IndiaMart v. Puma SE, Delhi HC (DB), ¶92 (Indian Kanoon)

In Wikimedia Foundation v. ANI Media, the Delhi HC Division Bench held:

"Since Wikipedia itself claims to be an intermediary... it is entitled to 'Safe Harbour' under Section 79 of the IT Act only if it observes 'due diligence' in terms of the IT Rules, 2021."

— Wikimedia v. ANI, Delhi HC (DB), ¶26 (Indian Kanoon)

The Court also established an important corollary: an intermediary claiming safe harbour cannot simultaneously assert content defences (truth, justification) — it must choose between being an intermediary or a publisher.

IV. The "Active Participation" Debate — A Key Tension

A. The Christian Louboutin Active Participation Test (2018)

In Christian Louboutin SAS v. Nakul Bajaj (Darveys.com), Delhi HC, 2 Nov 2018 (Indian Kanoon), Justice Prathiba M. Singh created a multi-factor test for determining whether an e-commerce platform has crossed from intermediary to active participant:

"When an e-commerce company claims exemption under Section 79 of the IT Act, it ought to ensure that it does not have an active participation in the selling process. The presence of any elements which shows active participation could deprive intermediaries of the exemption."

— Christian Louboutin v. Nakul Bajaj, ¶78 (Indian Kanoon)

Factors indicating active participation include: quality checks, packaging, pricing control, invoice-branding, seller curation, and exercising "complete control over the products."

B. Amazon Seller Services v. Modicare — Rejection of the Active/Passive Distinction (2020)

In Amazon Seller Services v. Modicare, Delhi HC (DB), 31 Jan 2020 (Indian Kanoon), the Division Bench explicitly rejected the Louboutin active/passive dichotomy:

"In terms of Section 79 of the IT Act, there does not appear to be any distinction between passive and active intermediaries so far as the availability of the safe harbour provisions are concerned."

— Amazon v. Modicare, ¶119 (Indian Kanoon)

The Division Bench held that warehousing, transportation, and packing are "value-added services" that do not amount to initiating transmission or selecting/modifying content under Section 79(2)(b), and therefore do not disqualify a platform from safe harbour.

Current position: The Division Bench decision in Amazon v. Modicare carries greater weight than the Single Judge decision in Christian Louboutin. However, later cases (including IndiaMart v. Puma, 2025) cite both, suggesting the courts are gravitating toward a nuanced middle ground — no blanket active/passive bar, but specific conduct (like failing to prevent re-listing of delisted infringers) may constitute a due diligence failure.

V. Harmonization with Copyright Law

MySpace Inc. v. Super Cassettes Industries Ltd., Delhi HC (DB), 23 Dec 2016, resolved a critical question about how Section 79 interacts with the Copyright Act:

1. Section 79's non-obstante clause prevails over Section 81's copyright proviso:

"Section 79, has an overriding effect... the only restriction to be placed in the application of Section 79(1) is contained within the section: Section 79(2) and Section 79(3)."

— MySpace v. Super Cassettes, ¶46 (Indian Kanoon)

2. "Actual knowledge" in copyright context ≠ general awareness:

"A general awareness or apprehension that a work may be violative of copyright here would not pass the knowledge test."

— MySpace v. Super Cassettes, ¶36 (Indian Kanoon)

3. Automated processes ≠ knowledge:

Software modifications (transcoding, chunking, ad insertion) performed by automated processes do not constitute "selecting or modifying" content under Section 79(2)(b) and do not amount to "knowledge."

4. Distinction from Shreya Singhal in copyright context:

The Court recognised that Shreya Singhal's court-order requirement was specifically in the Article 19 (free speech) context, and copyright has its own notice mechanism under Section 51(a)(ii). This creates a potential nuance: for copyright cases, the "actual knowledge" threshold may be met by specific copyright notices (not just court orders), while for defamation cases, only a court order suffices.

VI. Extension to Criminal Liability

Courts have extended Section 79 safe harbour to shield intermediaries from criminal prosecution:

VII. Territorial Scope — Global Takedown Obligation

In Swami Ramdev v. Facebook, Inc., Delhi HC, 23 Oct 2019 (Indian Kanoon), Justice Prathiba M. Singh held that due diligence compliance under Section 79(3)(b) requires global removal, not mere geo-blocking:

"Removal or disabling of access under Section 79(3)(b) of information or data uploaded from India is not restricted as meaning removal or disabling access only to users located in India. The removal or disabling is linked with 'that resource' and not with the location of the user or viewer."

— Ramdev v. Facebook, ¶84 (Indian Kanoon)

VIII. The "Reasonable Prudent Person" Standard for Due Diligence

In Google India v. Visaka Industries, Andhra HC, 18 Nov 2016 (Indian Kanoon), the Court imported the Black's Law Dictionary definition:

"Due diligence" means "such a measure of prudence, activity or assiduity, as is properly to be expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a reasonable and prudent man under the particular circumstances; not measured by any absolute standard, but depending on the relative facts of the special case."

The Court also held that the burden lies on the plaintiff to plead and prove the intermediary had actual knowledge — without such pleading, the intermediary need not affirmatively prove due diligence.

IX. Server Location and Disclosure Obligations

In Neetu Singh v. Telegram FZ LLC, Delhi HC, 30 Aug 2022 (Indian Kanoon), the Court held:

• Server location outside India is irrelevant when the intermediary operates and targets Indian users
• Intermediary status does not exempt platforms from disclosure obligations (user details, IP addresses)
• Mere takedown is an "insufficient remedy" for hydra-headed infringement channels — disclosure of infringer details is also required

X. The Government Fact-Check Unit — Unresolved Constitutional Question

The 2023 amendment to Rule 3(1)(b)(v) of the IT Rules 2021, which empowered a government-designated Fact Check Unit (FCU) to identify content as "fake, false or misleading" regarding government business (with loss of safe harbour for non-compliant intermediaries), produced a split verdict in the Bombay HC:

• Justice A.S. Patel (striking down): The amendment "indirectly [does] what cannot be done directly... switches focus from the user to the intermediary and makes the service provider liable for user content. This is squarely the 'chilling effect'." — Kunal Kamra v. Union of India, Bombay HC, 31 Jan 2024 (Indian Kanoon)

• Justice Gokhale (upholding): The Rule satisfies the test in P. Krishnamurthy; fear of possible misuse cannot ground a declaration of ultra vires. — Association of Indian Magazines v. Union of India, Bombay HC, 31 Jan 2024 (Indian Kanoon)

The split verdict stands referred to a third judge and remains unresolved.

XI. Summary: The Jurisprudential Evolution

XII. Key Unresolved Tensions

1. Copyright vs. Defamation contexts: Does the Shreya Singhal court-order requirement apply equally to copyright takedowns, or does Section 51(a)(ii) of the Copyright Act provide a separate notice mechanism? (MySpace left this partly open.)

2. Active vs. Passive intermediaries: While Amazon v. Modicare (DB) rejected a blanket active/passive bar, the IndiaMart v. Puma line suggests specific platform conduct (re-listing, failure to prevent recurrence) can still constitute a due diligence failure — approaching the Louboutin test by a different route.

3. FCU and government-mandated takedowns: The split verdict in Kunal Kamra leaves open whether government-designated fact-checking bodies can effectively override intermediary safe harbour.

4. Scope of "reasonable efforts" under the 2021 Rules: Courts have not yet drawn a clear line between acceptable "reasonable efforts" and the impermissible burden of proactively monitoring all content — the exact concern Shreya Singhal sought to prevent.