A research associate for Indian legal practice.

I have 84 candidate cases. Let me now dispatch parallel verification delegates to read the actual orders and confirm the tying/bundling reasoning in the most promising cases.

Excellent. I have strong verified findings. Several premise corrections needed: only Microsoft (03/2024), Harshita Chawla (15/2020), and Manav Seva Dham (03/2022) are clean Section 4(2)(d) tying-rejection cases; Sonam Sharma is under Section 3(4)(a) but is the foundational tying analysis. Let me now check NCLAT and a few other important CCI cases I may have missed.

Let me dispatch one more verification for the NCLAT appeal where a tying finding was reversed, and also check the foundational COMPAT appeal in Schott Glass via Indian Kanoon.

Tying and Bundling Allegations Examined and Rejected under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002

1. Doctrinal Framework

Indian law on tying as an abuse of dominance under Section 4(2)(d) developed through two analytical templates that the CCI itself has articulated and that the Supreme Court has now consolidated:

(a) The Sonam Sharma three-condition formulation (under Section 3(4)(a) but treated as the foundational tying framework):

"(1) Presence of two separate products or services capable of being tied; (2) The seller must have sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied product; (3) The tying arrangement must affect a 'not insubstantial' amount of commerce." Sonam Sharma v. Apple Inc., ¶69.

(b) The Harshita Chawla four-condition test (under Section 4(2)(d) directly):

"(i) the tying and tied products are two separate products; (ii) the entity concerned is dominant in the market for the tying product; (iii) the customers or consumer does not have a choice to obtain the tying product only without the tied product; and (iv) the tying is capable of restricting/foreclosing competition in the market." Harshita Chawla v. WhatsApp, ¶93.

(c) The Supreme Court formulation in CCI v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd. (13 May 2025):

"Section 4(2)(d) of the Act is attracted only where a dominant enterprise: supplies two distinct products, makes the supply of the tying product conditional upon acceptance of the tied product, and thereby forecloses competitors in the tied-product market." ¶54. (Adopting the Microsoft v. EU Commission framework.)

A tying allegation can fail at any of these conditions. The cases below show the principal grounds on which Indian competition authorities and appellate courts have rejected tying claims.

2. Cases Where Tying Was Not Established

A. Cases applying the Section 4(2)(d) four-condition test and rejecting it

B. Cases where the Section 4 abuse claim (including tying) failed at the threshold of dominance

C. Cases where the alleged conduct was held not to constitute a tie at all

3. Appellate Reversals of CCI Tying Findings

Schott Glass / Kapoor Glass — the leading reversal of a Section 4(2)(d) tying finding

This is the only Indian case in which a CCI finding of contravention under Section 4(2)(d) was set aside on appeal and that reversal has now been affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Stage 1 – CCI (29 March 2012): In Kapoor Glass v. Schott Glass India, Case No. 22/2010, the CCI majority found Schott contravened §4(2)(d) by aggregating Neutral Glass Clear (NGC) and Neutral Glass Amber (NGA) tube purchases for rebate calculation, treating it as a tying of clear tubes to amber tubes (Schott had ~90% share in amber). Penalty ~₹5.66 crore plus cease-and-desist. (Open)

Stage 2 – COMPAT (2 April 2014) set aside the CCI order:

"NGA, which is also the product of the same tanks as NGC, could not have been said to be an entirely different material... the two products cannot be said to be entirely different from each other... There would be therefore, no necessity of pushing the amber tubes along with the clear tubes. The very language of section 4(2)(d) and more particularly the emphasised portion renders the interpretation on the part of the CCI to be incorrect." (¶62) "If there was any such insistence on the part of the Appellant, surely there would have been some evidence somewhere apart from the stray, untested oral statements of some parties, who were clearly enemically disposed towards the Appellant." (¶63) "If the discount policy has not been found in error of any provisions, there is no question of linking it with the aforementioned question of tying-in." (¶66)

Stage 3 – Supreme Court (13 May 2025) affirmed COMPAT in Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd., dismissing both appeals with costs of ₹5,00,000 against Kapoor Glass. The Court adopted the Microsoft v. EU Commission three-element framework and held:

"Section 4(2)(d) of the Act is attracted only where a dominant enterprise: supplies two distinct products, makes the supply of the tying product conditional upon acceptance of the tied product, and thereby forecloses competitors in the tied-product market." (¶54) "On that uncontested evidence, it can be inferred that the two grades are best regarded as alternative specifications of one input rather than as independent products." (¶55) "Recognised commentary treats such aggregation as a multi-product volume discount, not tying... every converter increased output while imports, especially of NGC, rose steadily. None of rival tube makers exited the business. The indispensable element of foreclosure is therefore absent." (¶56) "In these circumstances, the essential elements of Section 4(2)(d) of the Act are not proved as NGA and NGC are not independent products; converters were never compelled to buy both; no foreclosure was demonstrated; and, in any event, the rebate design is objectively justified. The finding of tying cannot therefore stand, and Issue IV is answered in the negative." (¶58)

CCI v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd., decided 13 May 2025 (Open).

Hyundai Motor India — NCLAT reversal of a Section 3(4)(a) tie-in finding

In Hyundai Motor India Ltd. v. CCI, Competition Appeal (AT) No. 6/2017, decided 19 September 2018, the NCLAT set aside the CCI order in Fx Enterprise Solutions v. Hyundai (Cases 36 & 82/2014) which had found a §3(4)(a) tie-in for lubricants/oils. NCLAT held:

"The finding that the Appellant has mandated its dealers to use recommended lubricants/oils and penalised them for use of non-recommended lubricants and oils is also not based on any evidence. Nothing brought on the record by the 'DG' or the 'Commission' to suggest that the Appellant penalised one or other dealer for not utilising the recommended lubricants and oils." (¶48) "Normally car dealers of all companies recommend use of a particular quality of lubricants and oils which are mere suggestion keeping in mind the types of vehicle." (¶49) "The 'DG' as well as the 'Commission' also failed to decide 'relevant geographic market' or a 'relevant product market' as required under Section 19(6) & (7) of the Act, 2002." (¶50)

The CCI order was set aside in entirety (¶51). (Clauseo)

Note on subsequent history: the NCLAT order was itself the subject of further proceedings before the Supreme Court. Practitioners should track the latest position before relying on Hyundai-NCLAT as good law on the evidentiary standard for tie-in.

4. Recurring Grounds for Rejection of Tying Claims

Across the verified body of orders, six recurring grounds emerge:

1. No dominance in the tying-product market — Sonam Sharma (Apple ~3-6% smartphones), Manav Seva Dham (no concrete evidence; collective dominance not in the Act), Consumer Online Foundation (individual DTH operators not dominant), Buchi Ramarao (multiple competing senior-living developers).

2. Two products are not truly separate — Schott Glass SC (¶55: NGC and NGA "alternative specifications of one input rather than as independent products"); Consumer Online Foundation (¶18.33: "STB/CAM is an intrinsic part of the service of direct to home transmission").

3. No coercion / consumer retains choice — Harshita Chawla (¶96: "consumers are at freewill to use WhatsApp Pay or any other UPI enabled digital payments app"); Microsoft 03/2024 (¶33: "users retain the autonomy to install and use any antivirus application of their preference"); Manav Seva Dham (¶15: "the customer is neither bound to obtain insurance for the vehicle from the manufacturer or its broking arm nor that of any particular insurance company"); Schott Glass SC (¶58: "converters were never compelled to buy both").

4. No foreclosure / market remains competitive — Microsoft 03/2024 (¶34: continued presence of Symantec, Bitdefender, Norton, McAfee, AVG); Sonam Sharma (¶78: no entry barriers, no driving out of competitors); Schott Glass SC (¶56: every converter increased output, imports rose, no rival exited).

5. Conduct is normal industry practice or has objective justification — Hyundai NCLAT (¶49: lubricant recommendations are "mere suggestion"); Schott Glass SC (¶57: rebate aggregation justified by furnace operating constraints — "manufacturing efficiency is a legitimate business consideration").

6. Conduct relates to a contractual/consumer dispute, not competition — JHS Svendgaard (¶9: contract manufacturer's grievance is contractual, "remedy for the same lies elsewhere"); Buchi Ramarao (¶20: producer-consumer agreements outside §3(4) altogether); the Akhil Bhansali v. Skoda, Case No. 44/2017 line of dealer-service complaints recharacterised as consumer disputes.

5. Important Premise Cautions

• Sonam Sharma v. Apple is universally cited as the leading Indian tying authority, but the substantive tying analysis (the three-condition test at ¶69) was applied under Section 3(4)(a), not Section 4(2)(d). The §4(2)(d) claim was rejected at the antecedent stage of dominance.

• Vishal Pande v. Honda Motorcycle and Scooter India, Case No. 17/2017 (CCI, 14 Mar 2018), although it appears in tying searches, is a Section 26(1) order in which the CCI found a prima facie case under Section 4(2)(d) and ordered DG investigation. It is the opposite of a rejection precedent.

• Saturn Vehicles v. Hyundai (Case No. 35/2017) and Akhil Bhansali v. Skoda (Case No. 44/2017) are cited in the database for tying mentions, but neither addressed Section 4(2)(d): the former was a §3(4) case dismissed on res-judicata-style grounds (already covered by FX Enterprise), and the latter was a §4(2)(b) case dismissed as a consumer-grievance complaint.

• The NCLAT decision in Google LLC v. CCI, Competition Appeal (AT) No. 1/2023 (29 Mar 2023) upheld all substantive Section 4 tying/bundling findings against Google in the Android case, including the ₹1,337.76 crore penalty. NCLAT only set aside four of the ten remedial directions; only direction 617.7 (anti-uninstallation) and 617.3 (API access) were tying-related. The case is therefore not authority for rejection of tying liability, only for partial dilution of remedies. (Clauseo)

• The WhatsApp/Meta NCLAT appeals (2025) from CCI's later 2024 order on the WhatsApp privacy policy update are pending/partly allowed but do not concern tying under §4(2)(d) — the underlying CCI 2024 order on data sharing is doctrinally distinct from the 2020 Harshita Chawla tying analysis.

6. Strategic Takeaway for a Defence Brief

A respondent defending a Section 4(2)(d) tying allegation has, on current law, four conjunctive lines of attack: (i) attack the separate-products characterisation (Schott SC, ¶55); (ii) negate dominance in the tying-product market (Sonam Sharma, Manav Seva Dham, Buchi Ramarao); (iii) demonstrate that consumers retain genuine choice and there is no coercion (Harshita Chawla, Microsoft 03/2024, Schott SC); and (iv) show the absence of actual or capable foreclosure in the tied market (Microsoft 03/2024, Schott SC). Failure of any one element under the Harshita Chawla / Schott SC framework defeats the §4(2)(d) claim. Where the conduct can be characterised as a multi-product volume discount or a normal industry practice with manufacturing efficiency or product-safety justifications, courts have been receptive (Schott SC ¶¶56-57; Hyundai NCLAT ¶49).