I'll research this systematically across both the CCI/NCLAT database and Indian Kanoon. Let me start with parallel searches to discover relevant cases.
I've found numerous relevant CCI cases. Now let me verify the most significant ones and also search Indian Kanoon for appellate court decisions. I'll run these in parallel.
I have comprehensive findings. Let me get the proper citations for the key court judgments before composing my response.
Here is a comprehensive analysis of cases where tying or bundling allegations under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 were examined but were either not established or not found violative.
I. Supreme Court — Definitive Authority
CCI v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd., C.A. No. 5843/2014, decided 13 May 2025 ()
This is the most important authority on when tying under Section 4(2)(d) fails. The CCI had found Schott Glass guilty of tying its NGA (amber) and NGC (clear) glass tubes. The Supreme Court reversed the finding on four independent grounds:
The SC further laid down the mandatory requirement of effects-based analysis for all Section 4 proceedings — two separate findings are required: (i) identifying the conduct, and (ii) demonstrating actual or potential competitive harm. This applies across all Section 4(2) sub-clauses.
II. Delhi High Court — Jurisdictional Ouster for Patent Tying
Monsanto Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. CCI, LPA 150/2020, decided 13 July 2023 ()
In the consolidated Ericsson–Monsanto matters, allegations included tying/bundling of SEPs with non-SEPs (portfolio licensing as tie-in). The Delhi HC Division Bench quashed the CCI proceedings — not on the merits of tying, but on jurisdictional ouster. It held that Chapter XVI of the Patents Act, 1970 (inserted by the 2003 amendment) is a "complete code in itself" on all issues pertaining to unreasonable conditions in patent licensing, ousting CCI's jurisdiction over patentee conduct. This is relevant because patent-related tying allegations cannot be adjudicated by the CCI at all.
III. CCI Orders — Tying/Bundling Not Established
The CCI has developed a four-condition test for Section 4(2)(d) tying (first articulated in the WhatsApp order and explicitly cited as precedent in the Microsoft order):
(i) The tying and tied products are two separate products; (ii) The entity is dominant in the market for the tying product; (iii) The customer has no choice to obtain the tying product without the tied product (coercion); (iv) The tying is capable of restricting or foreclosing competition (foreclosure).
Below are the most significant CCI orders where tying/bundling was not found violative, verified from the actual order text:
A. XYZ v. Microsoft Corporation, Case No. 03/2024, CCI, 3 March 2025 ()
Allegation: Microsoft bundles Microsoft Defender (antivirus) with Windows OS, violating Sections 4(2)(a)(i), 4(2)(b)(ii), 4(2)(c), 4(2)(d), and 4(2)(e).
Dominance: Established prima facie — Windows holds ~70% of the licensable desktop/laptop OS market in India; top 5 PC manufacturers collectively hold 85% market share.
Why tying was not established:
- No coercion (Condition iii): Users can freely install any third-party antivirus. When a third-party antivirus registers via MVI, Defender automatically disables its real-time protection. OEMs are also permitted to pre-install alternative antivirus software.
- No foreclosure (Condition iv): "Multiple well-established and prominent players continue to operate in the market without any indication of market foreclosure."
Outcome: Closed under Section 26(2) — no prima facie contravention of Section 4.
B. Harshita Chawla v. WhatsApp Inc. & Ors., Case No. 15/2020, CCI, 18 August 2020 ()
Allegation: WhatsApp pre-installed "WhatsApp Pay" (UPI payment feature) within its messaging app, amounting to tying under Section 4(2)(d) and leveraging under Section 4(2)(e).
Important distinction: The CCI noted that although the informant used the word "bundling," the allegation was more akin to tying (seller requiring buyers to purchase a tied product alongside the tying product), not bundling (two products sold in fixed proportion as a package at a particular price).
Dominance: Established prima facie in the "market for OTT messaging apps through smartphones in India."
Why tying was not established:
- No coercion (Condition iii): Users do not "automatically" or "mandatorily" have to use WhatsApp Pay. Registration requires accepting a separate terms of service and privacy policy. "In the absence of any explicit or implicit imposition which takes away this discretion, the mere integration does not seem to contravene Section 4(2)(a)(i)."
- No foreclosure (Condition iv): The allegation was premature — WhatsApp Pay had only received beta approval in February 2020 with less than 1% of Indian users on beta. Established UPI players (Google Pay, Paytm, PhonePe, Amazon Pay) were competing vigorously.
Outcome: Closed under Section 26(2) — no contravention made out.
C. Baglekar Akash Kumar v. Google LLC, Case No. 39/2020, CCI, 29 January 2021 ()
Allegation: Google integrated a "Meet" tab into the Gmail app during the COVID-19 pandemic, leveraging its dominant position in one market (email) to enter another (video conferencing) — alleged violation of Section 4(2)(e) (leveraging) and assessed also under Section 4(2)(d) (supplementary obligations).
Dominance: Not decided — the CCI bypassed the dominance question entirely, holding that "regardless of whether Gmail is a dominant app or not," the conduct did not appear to violate Section 4.
Why tying/leveraging was not established:
- No compulsion: Users of Gmail were not forced to use Google Meet; there were no adverse consequences for not using it.
- Independent availability: Google Meet was available as an independent app outside the Gmail ecosystem — anyone with a Google Account (not necessarily Gmail) could use Meet.
- Consumer choice: Users were free to use Zoom, Skype, Cisco Webex, Microsoft Teams, or any other VC app.
Outcome: Closed under Section 26(2) — no case made out.
D. ESYS Information Technologies v. Intel Corporation, Case No. 48/2011, CCI, 16 January 2014 ()
Allegation: Intel allegedly tied high-demand microprocessors with low-demand products through its product-mix incentive structure, forcing distributors to purchase both — under Section 4(2)(d) and Section 3(4)(a) (tie-in arrangement).
Why tying was not established:
- Targets not binding: Intel set quarterly revenue targets with product-mix ratios, but the mix ratio was "not mandatory but was desirable for the purpose of availing incentives." Intel did not pre-condition the purchase of any particular microprocessor on purchase of another.
- No bundling at discount: "No case of bundling, where the distributor gets low prices on purchasing two or more products together as compared to prices paid for purchasing them separately, is found."
- No foreclosure: Intel had "not restricted and limited the market by foreclosing the distribution network to its competitors."
Outcome: Closed — no contravention of either Section 3 or Section 4 established.
E. Kamble Sayabanna Kallappa v. Bennett Coleman & Co., Case No. 35/2016, CCI, 2 June 2016 ()
Allegation: Bennett Coleman offered The Times of India in a combo offer with Mumbai Mirror, Economic Times, or Maharashtra Times at ₹7 — alleged bundling/tying under Section 4.
Why tying was not established:
- Products available separately: All newspapers in the combo offer were also available for individual purchase at their respective prices.
- No compulsion: Consumers had the choice to purchase in combo or separately.
- Vendor conduct not attributable to OP: The vendor-level practice of selling TOI only with Mumbai Mirror (not the other combinations) could not be attributed to the opposite party.
Outcome: Closed under Section 26(2) — no contravention made out.
F. Indian Competition Review v. Gateway Terminals India, Case Nos. 47/2016 & 56/2016, CCI, 8 February 2017 ()
Allegation: Gateway Terminals (APM Terminals) alleged to have tied its Container Freight Station (CFS) services with container terminal services at JNPT, compelling shipping lines to use its preferred CFSs.
Why tying was not established — dominance itself failed:
- No dominance: Market share was declining (45.16% → 41.42% over three years); four competing terminals existed at JNPT; 33 other CFS players operated independently.
- Regulatory constraint: CFS selection was the prerogative of the consignee under Customs Department Notification No. 69/2011, not the terminal operator.
- Direct Port Delivery available: Gateway Terminals had started a DPD facility, enabling direct delivery without any CFS involvement.
Outcome: Closed under Section 26(2) — no contravention of either Section 3(4) or Section 4.
G. Jeetender Gupta v. BMW India Ltd., Case No. 104/2013, CCI, 28 February 2014 ()
Allegation: BMW forced "run flat tyre" technology on consumers without providing a spare tyre and bundled cars with its own subsidiary's insurance product "BMW Secure Advance," denying market access to other insurers and tyre manufacturers.
Why tying was not established — dominance itself failed:
- No dominance: Market shares in the Indian luxury car market were highly volatile and transient. BMW faced significant competitive constraints from Audi, Mercedes, JLR, Volvo, and Porsche.
- Additional observations: BMW did provide an emergency spare wheel system as an accessory (at additional cost), and the run flat tyre technology complied with AIS-110 (May 2009) standards.
Outcome: Information held "misconceived" — closed under Section 26(2).
IV. Summary — Analytical Framework
The cases reveal three distinct pathways through which tying/bundling allegations fail:
The Schott Glass decision of the Supreme Court (2025) is the definitive authority, establishing that each of these elements — separate products, coercion, foreclosure, and absence of objective justification — must be independently proved, and that an effects-based analysis is constitutionally mandated for all Section 4 proceedings. The CCI's own four-condition test (originated in WhatsApp and cited in Microsoft) is consistent with this framework.
Note: The Monsanto/Ericsson Delhi HC decision adds an additional dimension: where tying allegations relate to the exercise of patent rights, the CCI's jurisdiction may be entirely ousted in favour of the Controller of Patents under Chapter XVI of the Patents Act. This ruling is from a Division Bench but has not yet been confirmed by the Supreme Court.